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WHEN BAD BOOKS HAPPEN TO GOOD
PEOPLE: ROBERT NELSON'S
ECONOMICS AS RELIGION
Fred S. McChesneyt
"I believe
Do believe
I believe
Yeah believe, pretty baby. "'
Bob Nelson is a nice guy. And a smart guy-Ph.D. in economics
from Princeton. So what possessed him to write this book?
2
I. ECONOMICS
Nelson's principal claim is that economists are often more advo-
cates, or preachers, than they are scientists. He begins his story with
Paul Samuelson's Foundations of Economic Analysis, carries on with
discussion of the "Chicago school" of economics, and then the so-
called New Institutional Economics (NIE) identified with various
economists. Bits and bobs from other strains of economic thinking,
such as public choice, float around in the book's various chapters.
Nelson likes almost none of what the economists writing from
these different perspectives have to say. In a lengthy career as a gov-
ernment economist, he says, he learned that "formal economic calcu-
lations had little to do with most policy decisions" 3 advocated by
economists. Rather, economists have a set of beliefs that they urge
upon the rest of the world under the pretext that economics is science:
t Northwestern University: Class of 1967 / James B. Haddad Professor (Law School);
Professor, Department of Management & Strategy (Kellogg School of Management).
I RICKY NELSON, BELIEVE WHAT YOU SAY (Imperial 1958). The song, written by
Johnny Burnette and Dorsey Burnette, reached the #4 position on the Billboard charts in April,
1958. JOEL WHITBURN, THE BILLBOARD BOOK OF TOP 40 HITS: 1955 TO PRESENT 195 (1983).
2 ROBERT H. NELSON, ECONOMICS AS RELIGION: FROM SAMUELSON TO CHICAGO AND
BEYOND (2001).
3 Id. at xvi.
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Like others before them, current economists have a frame-
work of thought and a set of presuppositions that define their
basic outlook on the world. Most of them, for example, are
among the true believers in the potential for a rational world.
Many economists believe in economic progress in a religious
way, as something that is significantly improving the basic
human condition for the better. Yet, on the whole, they are
remarkably unreflective on such foundational matters. One of
my aims in this book is to offer some preliminary explora-
tions in these theological domains, as labeled here economic
theology.
4
Nelson hammers home his basic point throughout the book. He refers
to economists as "the latest class of priestly deliverers of authoritative
blessings.",5 He further writes, "The most vital religion of the modem
age has been economic progress," and economists "have been the
modem priesthood of the religion of progress." 6
Few economists reading about economics A la Nelson will recog-
nize it as the discipline they studied and practice. A lot of "econom-
ics" set out in the book is just weird. The weirdness starts in the
book's Foreward, in which Max Stackhouse of the Princeton Theo-
logical Seminary states that, according to economists, "Economics
can deliver us, bring about a redeemed state of affairs on earth, and
lead us to abundant living-the materially incarnate form of salva-
tion."7 In all my years as an economist, I have never heard about any
"materially incarnate form of salvation" as part of my discipline. In-
deed, were I to start talking in these terms among my colleagues,
claiming that I was doing economics, I would be laughed out of the
room.
Stackhouse continues, "It has, as everyone who has been paying
attention knows, become fashionable to see every theory as a social
construct, as a weapon of the winners in life to justify their own
dominance and to keep the losers in a situation of subordination or
marginalization. ' ' 8 This is pure theo-sociological babble. It has noth-
ing to do with economics. 9 In the same vein, Nelson then presents the
"essence" of his argument.
4 Id. at xix-xx.
5 Id. at 301.
6 Id. at 329.
7 Max L. Stackhouse, Foreward to NELSON, supra note 2, at ix.
8 Id. at xiii.
I I also find it hard to believe that Professor Stackhouse, the Stephen Colwell Professor
of Christian Ethics, with no apparent background in formal economics, could understand the
work of the economists discussed in Nelson's book, even if he has read them.
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In economic religion, the existence of a market economic sys-
tem itself serves a religious purpose. Hence, while perhaps
objectionable in other contexts, the full expression of self-
interest within the setting of the market is therefore blessed
by a religious cause .... Economic progress is so important
because progress is seen as the path to the attainment of a
new heaven on earth, to a secular salvation .... The Fall in
the Garden of Eden will finally be reversed, now in our own
age by the application of economic knowledge to sustain
rapid economic progress. Because the market in this gospel
has such an exalted function in society, it is the duty of every
follower in the faith to defend the market system.' 0
Economists reading this can only be stunned, all the more so be-
cause it is written by an economist. No economist that I know (except
for Bob Nelson) thinks that economics claims to show a way to "sal-
vation," or to a "new heaven on earth." To the contrary, any econo-
mist worth his salt would steadfastly maintain that no such thing is
possible. The best economics can do is point out better ways to
achieve what us poor-not yet saved-mortals seek to achieve on
earth-an earth created by God. As anyone willing to glance around
him will perceive, a free-market economy works better than any al-
ternative in most instances in achieving aims that we believe God
intended for us: life, liberty, peace, and pursuit of happiness for our-
selves and our families."
Buoyed by his general notion of "economic theology,"' 2 Nelson's
discussion of specific economists is likewise out of step with what
economists actually do. For example, in his discussion of the Chicago
school, the largest single group of economists that Nelson considers,
he largely ignores the seminal economic ideas and research that
brought that premier group to the fore in their discipline.13 From this
book, one would conclude that Chicago economists are mere prosely-
tizers, mounting a pulpit, who have never done anything except pre-
pare sermons. To him, they are just "economic missionaries." 14
10 NELSON, supra note 2, at 9.
H Nelson seems confused at times about what a "market economy" is. Id. at 1. He points
to post-communist Russia as an example that "a market economy may function very poorly." Id.
But no one who is familiar with the Russian economy today would possibly mistake it for a
market system. State control of various economic sectors remains tight, property rights are very
uncertain, and the rule of law has yet to establish itself.
12 NELSON, supra note 2, at xviii & n.*.
13 Id. at 119-207. Strangely, Nelson repeatedly refers to the work of University of Chicago
economists collectively as the "Chicago project," as if there was some master plan or agenda,
with complementary parts assigned to individual economists. E.g., id. at 168-70.
14 Id. at 163.
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Take Nelson's analysis of Milton Friedman. He views Friedman as
a preacher 15 because of Capitalism and Freedom, a book written for
the general audience. 16 Among economists, Capitalism and Freedom
is respected as a book written for noneconomists, one that "liberated
the study of market economics from its ivory tower and brought it
down to earth."' 17 Perhaps the most important argument in Capitalism
and Freedom is that in favor of education vouchers, 18 an argument
that Friedman has advanced passionately ever since as well.
So, in that sense, admittedly, Friedman is a preacher. But the
preaching is based, not on some religious mysticism, but on rock-
solid economics. Public schools in America have a monopoly on edu-
cation, and economists generally accept that a monopoly obtained for
reasons other than providing a superior product is bad. As Friedman
wrote recently, "Just as the breakup of the Ma Bell monopoly led to a
revolution in communications, a breakup of the school monopoly
would lead to a revolution in schooling."1 9 The public-school product
is not superior-indeed, it is typically inferior. But public schools
maintain their monopoly by underpricing it and making up the reve-
nue shortfalls through coercive taxation. If a private company priced
like public schools, it would be subject to a predatory pricing suit.
Bob Nelson may choose to regard an economist's protest against a
predatory monopolist as "preaching," but few economists would view
it that way because they have a scientific basis for their conclusion
that such predation is harmful.
Nelson's focus on Capitalism and Freedom, written for a lay audi-
ence, rather than on Friedman's monumental contributions to eco-
nomics that led to Friedman's Nobel Prize, also lessens the persua-
siveness of his thesis. The Prize was awarded "for his achievements
in the fields of consumption analysis, monetary history and theory,
and for his demonstration of the complexity of stabilization policy. 20
One would never know this from reading Nelson's account of Fried-
man's work, which cites none of the truly path-breaking work that
Friedman has undertaken.2 ' In particular, Nelson ignores Friedman's
15 ia.
16 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
17 THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 786 (David R. Henderson ed., 1993).
18 FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 91-98.
19 Milton Friedman, School Vouchers Turn 50 but the Fight is Just Beginning, THE
SCHOOL CHOICE ADVOC. (Milton and Rose D. Found., Indianapolis, Ind.), Nov. 2005, at 13.
20 Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank
of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1976 (Oct. 14, 1976),
available at http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1976/press.html.
21 E.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953); MILTON
FRIEDMAN, A THEORY OF THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION (1957).
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coauthored Monetary History of the United States,22 which revolu-
tionized thinking about the role of monetary policy in macroeconomic
stabilization and growth. It continues to exert profound influence over
the monetary policy pursued by government today.23
Had Nelson discussed Friedman's Monetary History, Nelson still
would complain about economists' preaching. As with vouchers,
Friedman has never stopped preaching about the importance of
stability in monetary growth. But his preaching grows out of a study
that, in both theory and quantitative evidence, is pure economic
science.24 Nelson may call it religion if he likes, but Friedman goes to
the pulpit only when he has verified scientifically what his sermon
will proclaim.
Dismissing policy advice as preaching, when the "preaching" is
based primarily on science, is an incorrect characterization. Having
ignored the principal scientific contributions of Friedman, for exam-
ple, Nelson labels him as a religionist because he "went public" to try
to convince the world of the soundness of his ideas. 25 The fundamen-
tal problem with Nelson's thesis is that he views preaching and sci-
ence as necessarily antithetical, rather than complementary. Preaching
and science are not mutually exclusive: one can do science from
Monday to Friday and write sermons over the weekend, based on that
science.
If Nelson were right, doctors also must be preachers, not scientists,
when they publicly denounce smoking and warn the public of the
dangers of cigarettes. Everyone in the medical profession, from the
Surgeon General of the United States to your local general practitio-
ner will (and does) preach against smoking cigarettes. But the preach-
ing is based on a mass of scholarship showing the effects of smoking.
The preaching is based on the science. Indeed, without the science,
the preaching would be unpersuasive.
To make the same point in the context of economics, when
economists "preach" the value of private property versus common
ownership, it is not because they learned it at some seminary. Rather,
22 MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 1867-1960 (1963).
23 Greg Ip, Lessons of the '30s: Long Study of Great Depression Has Shaped Bernanke's
Views, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7. 2005, at A1, A15 (describing how Ben Bemanke, once chairman of
the Council of Economic Advisors and now succeeding Alan Greenspan as chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board, acknowledges the debt owed to Friedman in his own intellectual ap-
proach to monetary policy).
24 FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 676-700.
25 Nelson also quotes Gary Becker's writing in a "personal tribute" to Friedman, of
Friedman's "missionary[] zeal in the worship of truth," as evidence that Friedman is some sort
of economic missionary. NELSON, supra note 2, at 163. One would think that zeal in the pursuit
of truth would be viewed positively, not negatively.
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they learned it by reading empirical literature about the effects of
common property, and because they have looked around at what hap-
pens (for example, in Communist countries) when property is not
owned privately. What economists then do is not preaching-it is
teaching. Teaching is not the same thing as religion.
There are other curious aspects of Nelson's description of Chicago
economics. He wonders why, in terms of personal interest, these
economists do what they do.26 The endowment of the University of
Chicago is smaller than that of, say, Harvard or Yale, where eco-
nomic opinions are "closer to the mainstream of professional opin-
ion, ''2 7 and so Ivy League universities are better funded. Ergo, to Nel-
son, the entire Chicago school is one big self-contradiction: they
could make more money if they just acted like those guys at Harvard
and Yale.
Within the standard framework of thought of the Chicago
school of economics, it thus seems difficult to understand its
own existence. It is another example of a certain degree of
intellectual confusion at Chicago .... Indeed, there may be
little alternative to turn to ideas and motives outside the
normal framework of Chicago thinking in order to find a way
of explaining the behavior of Chicago economists. Many of
them may not be responding to price and other economic
incentives but may simply believe in what they are doing.
They may be willing to sacrifice to continue doing it, even
when such efforts may come at some professional cost, and
perhaps at some personal loss (as in a life in which some
normal pleasures are foregone in an ascetic dedication to
scholarly pursuits). . . .Outside the economics profession,
most people assume that such motivations are commonplace
in the world, in the most extreme cases producing people
such as Mother Teresa and other candidates for sainthood.
Indeed, this hypothesis does an adequate job of predicting
many features of the behavior of Friedman, Stigler, and other
Chicago economists. 28
It does? Friedman, Stigler et al., paid healthy six-figure incomes by
the University of Chicago (not to mention outside consulting fees),
working at most nine months a year, and winning Nobel Prizes,
26 Id. at 162-63.
27 Id. at 162.
28 Id. at 163.
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should be viewed like those who take vows of poverty? I don't think
so. Neither, I think, will anybody else. 9
Nelson also commits the mortal sin of confusing positive with
normative economics. By definition, positive economics is anything
but preaching. It is simply an attempt (maybe successful, maybe not)
to describe the way the world works, with no judgments about
whether what is observed is good or bad. Economic models start with
the notion (perhaps unfortunately named) that individuals are "utility-
maximizers," that they are largely motivated by self-interest. Nelson
finds this notion-which most people would accept simply as a
matter of common sense-unacceptable. Throughout the book, he
rails against economists' fundamental assumption that people do act
to further their own aims, contrasting that assumption with the
religious principle that we should act to help others. 30 But when
economists work with the utility-maximization assumption, they are
describing, not prescribing, human behavior. There is no normative
judgment as to whether furthering one's welfare is a good or a bad
thing, only a claim that such an assumption is useful in describing
how people behave.31
To take one example, Nelson complains of Nobel laureate Gary
Becker's analysis of crime.32 Becker attempts to present an economic
model of why people commit crime, and how optimally (from an
economic point of view) to deter it.33 Nelson summarizes Becker's
bottom line: "The real scientific issue is thus the 'optimal' amount of
crime a society should plan to tolerate.
34
To any economist, this is self-evident. Crime is bad, but
preventing it is costly. And so the decision is how many resources
should be devoted to deterring crime. The local bank hires more
29 Contrary to what Nelson is writing here, economists do not dismiss or discount non-
pecuniary forms of satisfaction ("utility," to use the economic jargon). Those with strong be-
liefs, held for whatever reason, derive satisfaction from espousing them publicly. One might
well ask Robert Nelson whether he is making money on his book, published by the Penn State
Press, or whether he instead wrote it for the satisfaction of advancing his points of view. If non-
pecuniary motives are driving his work, he and the Chicago economists he discusses are pulling
on the same oars.
" On the role of assumptions generally, see, for example, Steven E. Landsburg, PRICE
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 653-55 (5th ed. 2002).
31 To use an example, an economist will present evidence that the death penalty lowers
crime rates, with no claim that the death penalty is good or bad as a moral matter. Isaac Ehrlich,
The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, I J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 265 (1972). Other
economists may disagree with the evidence presented. But the issue in the debate will be
whether the evidence supports a conclusion that capital punishment lowers crime rates, not
whether executing criminals is morally (religiously) correct.
32 NELSON, supra note 2, at 172-76.
33 E.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968).
34 NELSON, supra note 2, at 173.
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security personnel than does the local 7-Eleven for economically
obvious reasons: security is costly, and so more will be hired as the
amount at risk increases.
Nelson, however, objects to this positive approach.
Becker's treatment of crime highlights the absence of any ab-
solute social concepts such as "justice" or "morality" in the
framework of thought that he applies to human behavior. In-
dividuals may constrain their behavior of their own accord
(based on some concept of "justice" in their mind) but there is
no place where "society" meaningfully says, "this is not al-
lowed because it 'is wrong.''35
In the end, one is left suspicious that Nelson is not unhappy be-
cause economists practice "religion" (as he defines it), but just does
not like economics, period. Economists admittedly have their models
and their methods. Nelson does not like models; that is, constructs
such as utility-maximization, thought useful in predicting behavior.
These constructs do not claim to capture every single aspect of every
single individual's behavior--economics is a social science, not a
one-on-one analysis of someone's personal psychology. That is, in
attempting to model a particular problem, to reduce it to tractable
proportions, an economist tries to identify the major factors of impor-
tance in the behavior of society generally. Admittedly, this means
ignoring other factors thought to be of minor importance.
But Nelson, like many noneconomists, criticizes economists' mod-
els for not including every single factor of possible importance. For
example, Nelson discusses Gary Becker's work on the family, 36 work
which resulted in recognition by the Nobel committee for his "having
extended the domain of economic theory to aspects of human behav-
ior which had previously been dealt with-if at all-by other social
science disciplines such as sociology, demography and criminol-
ogy."' 37 Much of Becker's work concerned "allocation of time within
a family. He used the economic approach to explain the decisions to
have children and to educate them, and the decisions to marry and to
divorce.,, 38 Nelson pays little attention to this body of Becker's ac-
35 Id. at 173-74. Nelson's criticism here is somewhat incongruous, as he complains of the
absence of any morality in Becker's work, not his use of economics to preach morality.
16 Id. at 176-79.
31 Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank
of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1992 (Oct. 13, 1992)(on file at http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1992/press.html).
38 THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, supra note 17, at 777.
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complishments, but does criticize Becker's omission of a particular39
variable in decisions to marry: sex.
[T]here is about Becker an element of prudishness ...
Becker never gets down to brass tacks to discuss with any
conviction something on the minds of many people entering
into marriage-sex. It is as though sexual pleasure and the
broader sense of personal identify [sic] of each marriage part-
ner as a sexual being is just another "commodity," like bread
on the table, that comes from marriage and requires no further
special elaboration.4 °
Becker may or may not be prudish, but Nelson is certainly quaint.
While he was growing up, marriage was perhaps the necessary condi-
tion for sex.4 1 Today, sex is a necessary condition for marriage. For
better or for worse, sex has in fact become a commodity.
In that sense, why is Nelson picking on economics? All social sci-
ence operates by using models of the issue or phenomenon under
study, meaning some variables are included and some excluded. Nel-
son could just as easily have written a book called "Political Science
as Religion"; one hears that the political process may entail sex as a
commodity, but I have yet to see it included in any political-science
models. Or the book could have been "Sociology as Religion.' 4 2 Or
how about "Law as Religion"? Lawyers work daily with models con-
structed by statutes and judicial opinions. We fervently believe, for
example, that increasing fines and punishments reduces the amounts
of unwanted behavior. And there are a lot more lawyers out there
practicing their religion than there are economists.
II. THEOLOGY
Noneconomists writing about economics from a theological per-
spective seem confused as to the difference between the two disci-
plines. Reviewing Nelson's book, the Catholic weekly magazine
America wrote: "Economics has dabbled in theology from its begin-
nings. Two centuries ago, Adam Smith, the father of economics, got
the theological ball rolling with his assertion that prices were deter-
3' NELSON, supra note 2, at 179-8 1.
40 Id. at 179-80.
41 As the Beach Boys sang forty years ago, "Wouldn't it be nice if we were older / Then
we wouldn't have to wait so long." THE BEACH Boys, WOULDN'T IT BE NICE (Capitol Records
1966).
42 Gary Becker holds a joint appointment in the Department of Sociology at the University
of Chicago.
2006]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
mined by the 'Invisible Hand' of competition in the market. 4 3
Surely, the extent of competition affects prices. But how is that a
theological assertion? Would an atheist think otherwise?
Similarly, it is sometimes difficult to know what Nelson means by
"economic theology." For the most part, as best I can tell, he is refer-
ring to economists' beliefs that certain laws of economics hold true,
without requiring any real proof of their truth. If so, he is right.
Economists--Christian, Muslim or atheist-believe that the market
competition affects prices. Likewise, economists do not need proof
each and every time they address a new problem, such as that demand
curves slope down, that is, that as prices increase, quantities pur-
chased decline, all other things equal. Next, they may well turn
around and explain to the public that commodity (e.g., sugar) price
supports raise American sugar prices, which will cause American
candy companies to purchase less sugar in the United States, buy
more sugar abroad, or even relocate their plants outside the United
States.
So, in that sense, one could call what economists are doing
"preaching." But it is preaching on the basis of experience. On the
basis of considerable experience, economists know that demand
curves slope downward and that the extent of competition determines
market prices. It is preaching on the basis of science, not in lieu
thereof.
Perhaps the greatest deficiency in the book is that Nelson seems to
regard economics and religion as substitutes. You cannot do
economics and do religion. But in fact, they are complements. Both
economists and theologians engage in similar searches for truth.
Admittedly, the objects of interest are different for the two groups:
economists seek to explain the natural, theologians the supernatural.
But by definition, explaining life here on earth now and life elsewhere
and hereafter do not conflict. Rather, one would like to use insights
from both specialized disciplines (economics and theology) to arrive
at the fullest possible understanding of God's plan for us now and
later, here and there.
But in both disciplines, the same fundamental questions arise.
What can we know about God's plan, including the way the world He
has created works? The issue of human knowledge and our confi-
dence in it has of course long been of interest to philosophers, princi-
pally those writing during the early Renaissance (or Enlightenment),
43 John Omicinski et al., The God of No Return, AMERICA, Mar. 18, 2002, at 30, 30.
Omicinski, who reviews Nelson's book favorably, is described as a correspondent who, "in his
more than 40 years" of newspaper work, "has covered defense, politics, foreign policy and the
tenure of Pope John Paul II." 1d.
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such as Descartes (cogito ergo sum) and Montaigne (Que sais-je?).
How do we know what we know, and how sure can we be that what
we think we know is true?
Among theologians, these questions arise under the heading of
"revelation." 44 How is God's presence and plan for us revealed to us?
Just as economists seek to understand the world, revelation theology,
in the words of St. Thomas Aquinas, seeks to understand "the truths
necessary for our salvation. ' 45
Several more particular aspects of revelation theology relate to the
points that Nelson raises about economics. For example, we under-
stand the nature of God's promise and plan through experience. From
the Biblical accounts of Abraham and Moses through the Resurrec-
tion of Jesus, revelation "may be understood as the promise of an
ultimate meaning to history., 46 So it is with economics. We may not
know everything about capitalism, but we surely know that it is supe-
rior to other forms of economic organization just by looking around
us. And telling the world that it is so, while perhaps viewed as
"preaching" by some, is hardly based on opinions unrelated to centu-
ries of experience.
At the same time, we cannot know everything about that promise:
"The Bible does not specify in any completely clear way what this
meaning is."' 4 7 As with economics and our understanding of the natu-
ral world, revelation underscores that we cannot know everything
about the supernatural.
Revelation theology recognizes that science can help us under-
stand God's plan. Because what we can know about God and His plan
relies considerably on experience, revelation theology embraces the
ability of science to help us understand Him.
[T]he revelatory and healing significance of the promissory
events in the life of Israel and the church may not be obvi-
ously from the perspective of a purely external recital....
Scientific history can shed much interesting light on the his-
torical circumstances surrounding the great events upon
which hope is founded, and critical historical work can even
become a necessary ingredient in a community's recalling of
44 See AVERY DULLES, MODELS OF REVELATION 3 (1983) ("The Christian Church down
through the centuries has been committed to this revelation and has sought to propagate it,
defend it, and explain its implications."); John F. Haught, Revelation, in THE NEW DICTIONARY
OF THEOLOGY 884 (J. Komonchak et al. eds., 1987) (describing how revelation has been known
as a divine teaching or instruction).
45 Haught, supra note 44, at 886.
46 Id. at 889.
47 Id,
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its foundational moments .... Closely related to the historical
context is the human struggle to bring about the "right" social
order.... An attitude of trust in God's fidelity must accom-
pany our awareness of the seemingly irredeemable social, po-
litical and economic quandaries in which we find ourselves
embroiled today.48
In short, social science and religion are complements, not substitutes.
"Science can provide helpful assistance in our attempts to understand
the circumstances within which the mystery of God is disclosed. 49
III. CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, I am left perplexed by Nelson's thesis. La-
beling economists' policy advice as preaching provides a rhetorical
flourish but does not illuminate. To those who do not understand the
basis for economic advice, a group that does not include professional
economists like Nelson, economists' analyses of the operation of
markets and the impacts of public policy may seem as much a mys-
tery as the nature of the Trinity. But that does not mean economics
and religion must be opposed. Rather, they are (or can be) self-
reinforcing. Economics is rooted in empirically demonstrable truths
about how the world operates. Theological statements depend on the
acceptance of matters on faith. As complementary means of under-
standing the world, these two disciplines can combine to illuminate
our place in God's Creation. As a metaphor for understanding eco-
nomic thought, however, theology falls short.
48 id. at 890-91.
49 Id. at 898.
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